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Editor’s Note: The purpose of this Editor’s Choice article is transla-
tional in nature. It is intended to illustrate some of the most com-
mon examples of potential study bias to help policy makers, journ-
alists, trainees, and the public understand the strengths and
weaknesses of various types of health care research and the
kinds of study designs that are most trustworthy. It is neither a
comprehensive guide nor a standard research methods article.
The authors intend to add to these examples of bias in research
designs in future brief and easy-to-understand articles designed to
show both the scientific community and the broader population
why caution is needed in understanding and accepting the results
of research that may have profound and long-lasting effects on
health policy and clinical practice.
Evidence is mounting that publication in a peer-reviewed medical
journal does not guarantee a study’s validity (1). Many studies of
health care effectiveness do not show the cause-and-effect rela-
tionships that they claim. They have faulty research designs. Mis-
taken conclusions later reported in the news media can lead to
wrong-headed policies and confusion among policy makers, sci-
entists, and the public. Unfortunately, little guidance exists to help
distinguish good study designs from bad ones, the central goal of
this article.
There have been major reversals of study findings in recent years.
Consider the risks and benefits of postmenopausal hormone re-
placement therapy (HRT). In the 1950s, epidemiological studies
suggested higher doses of HRT might cause harm, particularly
cancer of the uterus (2). In subsequent decades, new studies em-
phasized the many possible benefits of HRT, particularly its pro-
tective  effects  on  heart  disease  — the  leading  killer  of  North
American women. The uncritical publicity surrounding these stud-
ies was so persuasive that by the 1990s, about half the postmeno-
pausal women in the United States were taking HRT, and physi-
cians were chastised for under-prescribing it.  Yet in 2003, the
largest randomized controlled trial (RCT) of HRT among post-
menopausal women found small increases in breast cancer and in-
creased risks of heart attacks and strokes, largely offsetting any
benefits such as fracture reduction (3).
The reason these studies contradicted each other had less to do
with the effects of HRT than the difference in study designs, par-
ticularly whether they included comparable control groups and
data on preintervention trends. In the HRT case, health-conscious
women who chose to take HRT for health benefits differed from
those who did not — for reasons of choice, affordability, or pre-
existing good health (4). Thus, although most observational stud-
ies showed a “benefit” associated with taking HRT, findings were
undermined because the study groups were not comparable. These
fundamental nuances were not reported in the news media.
Another pattern in the evolution of science is that early studies of
new treatments tend to show the most dramatic, positive health ef-
fects, and these effects diminish or disappear as more rigorous and
larger studies are conducted (5). As these positive effects decrease,
harmful side effects emerge. Yet the exaggerated early studies,
which by design tend to inflate benefits and underestimate harms,
have the most influence.
Rigorous  design  is  also  essential  for  studying health  policies,
which  essentially  are  huge  real-world  experiments  (1).  Such
policies, which may affect tens of millions of people, include in-
surance  plans  with  very  high  patient  deductible  costs  or
Medicare’s new economic penalties levied against hospitals for
“preventable” adverse events (6). We know little about the risks,
costs, or benefits of such policies, particularly for the poor and the
sick. Indeed, the most credible literature syntheses conducted un-
der the auspices of the international Cochrane Collaboration com-
monly exclude from evidence 50% to 75% of published studies
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because they do not meet basic research design standards required
to yield trustworthy conclusions (eg, lack of evidence for policies
that pay physicians to improve quality of medical care) (7,8).
This article focuses on a fundamental question: which types of
health care studies are most trustworthy? That is,  which study
designs are most immune to the many biases and alternative ex-
planations that may produce unreliable results (9)? The key ques-
tion is whether the health “effects” of interventions — such as
drugs, technologies, or health and safety programs — are differ-
ent from what would have happened anyway (ie, what happened to
a control group). Our analysis is based on more than 75 years of
proven research design principles in the social sciences that have
been largely ignored in the health sciences (9). These simple prin-
ciples show what is likely to reduce biases and systematic errors.
We will describe weak and strong research designs that attempt to
control for these biases. Those examples, illustrated with simple
graphics, will emphasize 3 overarching principles:
1. No study is perfect. Even the most rigorous research design can
be compromised by inaccurate measures and analysis, unrepres-
entative populations, or even bad luck (“chance”). But we will
show that  most  problems of  bias  are  caused  by  weak designs
yielding exaggerated effects.
2. “You can’t fix by analysis what you bungled by design” (10).
Research design is too often neglected, and strenuous statistical
machinations are then needed to “adjust for” irreconcilable differ-
ences between study and control groups. We will show that such
differences are often more responsible for any differences (effects)
than is the health service or policy of interest.
3. Publishing innovative but severely biased studies can do more
harm than good. Sometimes researchers may publish overly defin-
itive conclusions using unreliable study designs, reasoning that it
is better to have unreliable data than no data at all and that the nat-
ural progression of science will eventually sort things out. We do
not agree. We will show how single, flawed studies, combined
with widespread news media attention and advocacy by special in-
terests, can lead to ineffective or unsafe policies (1).
The case examples in this article describe how some of the most
common biases and study designs affect research on important
health policies and interventions, such as comparative effective-
ness of various medical treatments, cost-containment policies, and
health information technology.
The examples include visual illustrations of common biases that
compromise a study’s results, weak and strong design alternatives,
and the lasting effects of dramatic but flawed early studies. Gener-
ally, systematic literature reviews provide more conservative and
trustworthy evidence than any single study, and conclusions of
such reviews of the broad evidence will also be used to supple-
ment the results of a strongly designed study. Finally, we illus-
trate the impacts of the studies on the news media, medicine, and
policy.
Case 1: Healthy User Bias in Designs of
Studies of Influenza Vaccination
This case example describes healthy user bias in studies attempt-
ing to compare healthy users of influenza (flu) vaccines with un-
healthy nonusers (eg, frail, severely ill) and attributing the differ-
ences to the vaccines. Flawed results of poorly designed experi-
ments have dictated national vaccination policies. More rigorous
longitudinal studies suggest that national flu vaccine campaigns
have not lowered mortality rates in the elderly.
Background
Selection biases may be the most ubiquitous threat to the trustwor-
thiness of health research. Selection bias occurs when differences
between treatment recipients and nonrecipients or control groups
(based on such factors as income, race, or health) may be the true
cause of an observed health effect rather the treatment or policy it-
self.
Healthy user bias is a type of selection bias that occurs when in-
vestigators fail to account for the fact that individuals who are
more health conscious and actively seek treatment are generally
destined to be healthier than those who do not. This difference can
make it falsely appear that a drug or policy improves health when
it is simply the healthy user who deserves the credit (11).
One well-known example is the national campaign in the United
States to universally vaccinate all elderly people against the flu.
The goal is to reduce the most devastating complications of flu,
death and hospitalizations for pneumonia (12). No one disputes
the idea that flu vaccines reduce the occurrence and symptoms of
flu, but the national campaign was based on the assumption that
the vaccines could also reduce the number of pneumonia-related
hospital admissions and deaths. This assumption was based on
dozens of cohort studies that compared what happened to older pa-
tients who chose to get a flu vaccination with what happened to
older patients who did not or could not.
These cohort studies, however, did not account for healthy user bi-
as. For example, a study of 3,415 people with pneumonia (and at
high risk for  flu  and its  complications)  illustrated that  elderly
people  who received a  flu  vaccine were more than 7 times as
likely to also receive the pneumococcal vaccine as elderly people
who did not receive a flu vaccine (Figure 1). They were also more
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likely to be physically independent, have quit smoking, and to be
taking statins, a medication that improves survival of patients with
heart disease, diabetes, and other conditions and prevents heart at-
tacks and strokes among the elderly (13). In short, elderly people
who got the flu vaccine already were healthier, more active, and
received more treatment than those who did not and so had lower
rates of flu-related hospitalization and death during the study peri-
od (14).
Figure 1. Healthy user bias, a type of selection bias, is demonstrated in a
study  of  3,415 patients  with  pneumonia  (and at  high  risk  for  flu  and its
complications), where elderly flu vaccine recipients were already healthier
than nonrecipients. Figure is based on data extracted from Eurich et al (13).
 
Healthy user bias is a common threat to research, especially in
studies of any intervention where the individual patient can seek
out health care and choose to be immunized, screened, or treated
(14). This same type of bias is largely responsible for all the many
health “benefits” attributed to taking multivitamins, antioxidants
such as vitamin C or vitamin E, modest amounts of red wine, ve-
getarian or low red meat diets, fish oil supplements, chelation ther-
apy, and so on. Most of these interventions, when subjected to ran-
domized trials, show no particular benefits and, sometimes, even
harm.
Weak research designs that do not control for
healthy user bias
One of the most common study designs examining the risks and
benefits of drugs and other interventions is the epidemiological co-
hort design, which compares death and disease rates of patients
who receive a treatment with the rates of patients who do not. Al-
though seemingly straightforward, this design often fails to ac-
count for healthy user bias, especially in studies of health care be-
nefits.
For example, one of many weak cohort studies purported to show
that flu vaccines reduce mortality in the elderly (Figure 2). This
study, which was widely reported in the news media and influ-
enced policy, found significant differences in the rate of flu-re-
lated deaths and hospitalizations among the vaccinated elderly
compared with that of their unvaccinated peers (15). Although it
controlled for certain easy-to-measure differences between the 2
groups, such as age, sex, and diabetes, it did not account for other
more difficult-to-measure “healthy user” factors that affect the
well-being of the elderly, such as their socioeconomic status, diet,
exercise, and adherence to medical treatments and advice.
Figure 2. A weak cohort study comparing the risk of death or hospitalization
for pneumonia or flu among vaccinated versus unvaccinated elderly: example
of failure to control for healthy users. Figure is based on data extracted from
Nichol et al (15).
 
The cohort design has long been a staple in studies of treatment
outcomes. Because such studies often do not account for people’s
pre-existing health practices, they tend to inflate or exaggerate the
benefits of treatments (eg, the flu vaccine) while downplaying
harms (eg, HRT) (16). In general, we should be skeptical about the
benefits of health care interventions (such as the use of drugs or
vaccines) reported in cohort studies. On the other hand, the find-
ings of cohort studies related to harms and side effects of medica-
tions are often more credible because patients and their physicians
do not “choose” to be harmed and tend to avoid known harms.
Also, the same healthier people are less likely to have side effects
or quit medications. Finally, harms and complications are far rarer
than the possible benefits. For instance, whereas the benefits of the
flu vaccine can be shown in studies of a few thousand participants,
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hundreds of thousands of participants might be needed to demon-
strate the vaccine’s harms or side effects. For example, Guillain-
Barré syndrome occurs in 1 in 500,000 people who receive the flu
vaccine.
Strong research designs that do control for healthy
user bias
Epidemiological studies that have led to national campaigns have
been overturned by subsequent stronger studies. One landmark
study (12) found that the fourfold increase in the percentage of
elderly people in the United States receiving a flu vaccine during 3
decades (1968–1998) was accompanied not by a decrease, but an
increase,  in  hospitalizations  and  deaths  (Figure  3  in  http://
archinte.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=486407). This
does not mean the vaccination is  causing flu-related deaths or
pneumonia. It means the population is getting a bit older and a bit
sicker during flu season and the vaccine has little effect among the
elderly. This study did not have the healthy user bias found in the
previous study because it did not compare health-conscious eld-
erly people who chose to get  the flu vaccine with their  sicker
counterparts who chose not to.  Instead, it  evaluated whether a
marked rise in flu vaccines resulted in fewer deaths over time in
the entire population. This study, using a strong design with 30-
year trend data, demonstrates the power of pictures — little statist-
ical training is needed to interpret the graph.
A strong, particularly creative study published in 2010 (17) used
the same epidemiological design of the weak study illustrated in
Figure 2 to show that the so-called benefits of the flu vaccine were
statistically equivalent before, during, and after flu season (Figure
3). It is not plausible that the vaccine reduced the flu-related death
rate in the spring or summer in the absence of the flu, yet we ob-
serve the vaccine “protecting” the elderly all year (17).
Figure 3. Healthy user bias: a strong controlled study disproving the effects of
the flu vaccine on all-cause mortality in the elderly during the flu “off season”
(control  period).  The  cohort  study  compared  vaccinated  elderly  and
unvaccinated elderly. Figure is based on data extracted from Campitelli et al
(17).
 
The only logical conclusion one can reach from this study is that
the  benefits  during  the  flu  season  were  simply  a  result  of
something other than the effects  of  flu vaccine — most likely
healthy user bias. If fewer vaccinated elders die in the absence of
the flu, it is because they are already healthier than unvaccinated
elders who may be already too sick to receive a flu vaccination.
Studies with strong research designs that control for selection bias
and overturn the exaggerated findings of studies with weak re-
search designs show how weak science in combination with dra-
matic  results  can  influence  the  adoption  of  ineffective  health
policies. Certainly, greater use of flu vaccine may be reducing the
incidence and symptoms of flu. However, the massive national flu
vaccination campaign was predicated on reducing the number of
flu-related deaths and hospitalizations for pneumonia among the
elderly. It could be argued that the funds used for such a cam-
paign could be better spent on developing more effective vaccines
or treatments or other methods to reduce the spread of flu.
The news media played a major role in disseminating the mislead-
ing results of studies that did not properly take into account the in-
fluence of healthy user bias in claims that flu vaccinations could
reduce mortality rates and hospitalizations among the elderly. Re-
uters, for example (Box 1), was unequivocal in its support of a
cause-and-effect relationship based on the 2007 report (15) sug-
gesting that flu shots saved lives among the elderly.
Box 1. Reuters Health, October 3, 2007
Flu jab cuts illness and death in elderly
In a study of relatively healthy elderly HMO members, getting a flu
shot significantly reduced the odds of being hospitalized with an
influenza-related ailment and of dying. . . . “Our study confirms
that influenza vaccination is beneficial for reducing hospitalization
and death among community-dwelling HMO elderly over a 10-year
period,” said the lead author. . . . Flu vaccination reduced the risk
of hospitalization for pneumonia or influenza by 27 percent and
reduced the risk of death by 48 percent, the report indicates.
(Excerpted from http://in.reuters.com/article/2007/10/03/us-flu-
elderly-idINKUA37737120071003.)
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Case 2: Volunteer Selection Bias in
Studies of Health Information
Technology
This case example describes volunteer selection biases created by
studies that use “volunteer” hospital adopters of health informa-
tion technology (IT) and noncomparable “laggard” controls (the
common design in the field). Volunteer hospitals already tend to
have more experienced physicians and healthier patients, which
may influence health outcomes more than the intervention does.
The flawed results of these sorts of experiments led to federal
health IT initiatives, resulting in trillions of dollars spent on un-
proven  and  premature  adoption  of  the  technologies  and  few
demonstrated health benefits. RCTs failed to replicate the findings
on cost savings and lives saved suggested in the poorly designed
studies.
Background
Researchers often attempt to evaluate the effects of a health tech-
nology by comparing the health of patients whose physicians use
the technology with the health of patients whose physicians do
not. But if the 2 groups of physicians (or hospitals) are different
(eg, older vs younger, high volume vs low volume of services),
those  differences  might  account  for  the  difference  in  patient
health, not the technology being studied.
Our national investment in health IT is a case in point. Based in
part on an influential report from the RAND think tank (18), the
2009 federal stimulus law included a requirement that by 2014
physicians should adopt electronic health records (EHRs) with
“decision support” (eg, alerts to reduce the number of duplicate or
high-dose drugs). If physicians do not achieve this goal, they will
be penalized in the form of reduced Medicare reimbursements.
The program is a part of national health care reform and costs tril-
lions of dollars in public and private funds (19). But there is de-
bate about whether health IT can achieve the program’s goals of
better health and lower costs. In fact, the RAND think tank has re-
canted its earlier projections as being overly optimistic and based
on less than adequate evidence (20). Furthermore, recent studies
(and even the US Food and Drug Administration) are document-
ing that health IT can lead to the very medical errors and injuries
that it was designed to prevent (21,22).
Let’s examine some studies that illustrate how provider selection
biases may invalidate studies about the health and cost effects of
health IT. Figure 4 illustrates that underlying differences exist
between physicians and hospitals  who do or do not  use EHRs
(23,24). Large physician practices and teaching hospitals are much
more likely to use EHRs than are small or solo practices or non-
teaching hospitals. Because hospital size and teaching status are
predictors of quality of care (with larger hospitals and teaching
hospitals predicting higher quality), the 2 factors can create power-
ful biases that can lead to untrustworthy conclusions. Thus, al-
though studies may associate health IT with better patient health,
what they are really pointing out are the differences between older
physicians and younger physicians or differences between large
physician practices and small physician practices. Such large dif-
ferences between EHR adopters and nonadopters make it almost
impossible to determine the effects of EHRs on health in simple
comparative studies. Perhaps as more hospitals adopt EHRs or risk
penalties, this type of selection bias may decrease, but that is in it-
self a testable hypothesis.
Figure 4. Example of selection bias: underlying differences between groups of
medical providers show how they are not comparable in studies designed to
compare providers using EHRs with providers not using EHRs. Figure is based
on data extracted from Simon et al (23) and Decker et al (24). Abbreviation:
EHR, electronic health record.
 
Weak cross-sectional research designs that do not
control for differences in providers
The following example illustrates  how a weak cross-sectional
study (a simple correlation between a health IT program and sup-
posed health effects at one point in time) did not account for selec-
tion biases and led to exaggerated conclusions about the benefits
of health IT (25,26). The researchers set out to compare health
care sites using EHRs with health care sites using paper records to
determine whether patients with diabetes in health care settings
with health IT had better health outcomes than patients with dia-
betes in settings with only paper records (Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Example of weak post-only cross-sectional study that did not control
for selection bias: the study observed differences between practices with
EHRs and practices with paper records after the introduction of EHRs but did
not control for types of providers adopting EHRs. Note the unlikely outcome for
nonsmoker.  Figure  is  based  on  data  extracted  from  Cebul  et  al  (26).
Abbreviations: BMI, body mass index; EHR, electronic health record.
 
This weak cross-sectional design would be excluded because of
inadequate evidence of the effects of medical services and policies
by systematic reviewers adhering to the standards of the interna-
tional  Cochrane Collaboration (27).  The study compared out-
comes (eg, blood pressure control) of sites with EHRs and sites
without EHRs at one point in time after the introduction of EHRs
but did not provide data on such outcomes before the introduction
of EHRs; no measure of change was provided. It is virtually im-
possible to statistically equalize the groups on the hundreds of dif-
ferences (selection biases) that might have caused differences in
blood pressure outcomes; thus, such designs are among the weak-
est study designs in research attempting to establish cause and ef-
fect (9).
The questionable findings of this study suggested that EHRs might
not only improve blood pressure control but also reduce smoking
by 30 percentage points (Figure 5). (Strong smoking-cessation
programs, such as physician counseling programs, studied in rig-
orous randomized trials have resulted in a 1% to 2% reduction in
smoking [28].)
The conclusion of the report — that “the meaningful use of EHRs
may improve the quality of care” — is not warranted. Large prac-
tices,  teaching  hospitals,  and  younger  physicians  (Figure  4)
already deliver better care whether or not they use EHRs. Simil-
arly, even in their own study, the authors found that patients in
practices with EHRs had better health care to begin with (Figure
6). They tended to be white, less likely to be poor and rely on
Medicaid, and more likely to have commercial health insurance —
all indicators of a higher socioeconomic status associated with bet-
ter care that have nothing to do with EHRs.
Figure 6. Differences in patient characteristics between EHR-based practices
and paper-based practices in a weak post-only cross-sectional study that did
not control for selection bias. Abbreviation: EHR, electronic health record.
Figure is based on data extracted from Cebul et al (26).
 
Many other kinds of study design (9) can provide better evidence
of cause and effect than a post-only cross-sectional design can.
Nevertheless, the organization that funded the study, the Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation, hailed the results nationally (29), and
the news media were exuberant with praise (Box 2).
Box 2. Science Daily, August 31, 2011
Federal Investment in Electronic Health Records Likely to
Reap Returns in Quality of Care, Study Finds
A study . . . involving more than 27,000 adults with diabetes found
that those in physician practices using EHRs were significantly
more likely to have health care and outcomes that align with





Strong research designs that do control for
differences in providers
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Given the volunteer  selection biases in comparing unlike pro-
viders with EHRs and providers without EHRs, what designs can
level the playing field and yield more trustworthy results? The
“gold standard” of research designs (Figure 7) is the RCT.
Figure 7. Randomized controlled trial: the “gold standard” of research design. 
This simple design starts with a population (eg, patients, health
centers) and uses chance to randomly allocate some centers to the
intervention (eg, health IT or not [control]). The researchers then
test whether health in the intervention improved more than health
in the control. The randomization generally eliminates selection
biases, such as facility size or patient age or income. Such designs
can reduce bias if they adhere to methodological safeguards, such
as  blinding patients  to  their  treatment  status  and randomizing
enough patients or centers.
Consider the following randomized control trial involving a state-
of-the-art health IT system with decision support in nursing homes
(30). By randomizing 29 nursing homes (and 1,118 patients), the
researchers controlled for selection biases. The objective of the tri-
al was to examine the effect of computerized warnings about un-
safe combinations of drugs to reduce preventable drug-related in-
juries. The rigorous appraisal of health IT showed that it was inef-
fective at reducing injuries. Among study patients receiving the
health IT intervention, there were 4.0 preventable drug-related in-
juries per 100 residents per month; among control patients, there
were 3.9 preventable drug-related injuries per 100 residents per
month (Figure 8). This failure of the health IT intervention was
probably due to physicians ignoring most of the warnings, most of
which they felt were not relevant to their patients’ health (31). As
it often happens in medical research, this strong “negative” study
received less attention from the news media than the much weak-
er but positive studies proclaiming large benefits (5).
Figure  8.  A  strong  randomized  controlled  trial  of  the  effect  of  health
information technology  on the prevention of  drug-related injuries  among
nursing home residents.  Intervention participants received computerized
warnings  about  unsafe  combinations  of  drugs.  Figure  is  based  on  data
extracted from Gurwitz et al (30).
 
A single study,  no matter  how rigorous,  should never  be con-
sidered definitive. The best evidence of what works in medical sci-
ence comes from systematic reviews of the entire body of pub-
lished research by unbiased evaluators — after eliminating the
preponderance of  weak studies.  Such a review of hundreds of
health IT studies cited a lack of rigorous evidence (Box 3):
Box 3. Black et al, “The Impact of eHealth on the
Quality and Safety of Health Care: A Systematic
Overview. PLOS Medicine” (7)
[T]here is a lack of robust research on the risks of implementing
these technologies and their cost-effectiveness has yet to be
demonstrated, despite being frequently promoted by policymakers
and “techno-enthusiasts” as if this was a given.
Advancements in health IT may well achieve the promised cost
and quality benefits, but proof of these benefits requires more rig-
orous  appraisal  of  the  technologies  than  research  to  date  has
provided.
Case 3: Bias Due to Confounding by
Indication in Studies of the Effects of
Sedative-Hypnotic Medications on Hip
Fractures Among the Elderly
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This case example describes confounding by indication — biases
that plague the field of observational comparative effectiveness of
health care treatments. They occur because physicians choose to
preferentially treat or avoid patients who are sicker, older, or have
had an illness longer. In these scenarios, it is the trait (eg, demen-
tia) that causes the adverse event (eg, a hip fracture), not the treat-
ment itself (eg, benzodiazepine sedatives).
Landmark studies that failed to control for this bias nevertheless
influenced worldwide drug safety programs for decades, despite
better controlled longitudinal time-series studies that debunked the
early dramatic findings published in major journals.
Background
One of the oldest  and most accepted “truths” in the history of
medication safety research is that benzodiazepines (popular med-
ications such as Valium and Xanax that are prescribed for sleep
and anxiety) may cause hip fractures among the elderly. At first
glance, this adverse effect seems plausible because the drugs’ sed-
ating effects  might  cause falls  and fractures,  especially  in  the
morning after taking a sleep medication (32). Stronger evidence
published 2 decades later debunked this idea (33).
RCTs — in which similar patients are randomized to either treat-
ment or no treatment — are generally too small to detect such in-
frequent but important outcomes as a hip fracture: each year, less
than 0.5% to 1% of the elderly population has a hip fracture (34).
Unfortunately, this shortcoming promotes the use of weaker obser-
vational  studies  with  cross-sectional  designs,  which  compare
health outcomes of people who happen to be prescribed one treat-
ment with people who happen to be prescribed another treatment.
Researchers then attempt to adjust for other differences between
the 2 groups of people that may actually be responsible for the hip
fractures. Confounding by indication is an insidious and power-
fully misleading bias that is almost impossible to fix in any study.
It occurs because physicians choose or avoid certain treatments for
patients who are sicker, older, or have had the illness longer —
traits that cause the adverse health event (eg, hip fracture), not the
treatment itself.
Confounding by indication may be especially problematic in stud-
ies of benzodiazepines because physicians prescribe them to eld-
erly patients who are sick and frail. Because sickness and frailty
are often unmeasured, their biasing effects are hidden. Compared
with  elderly  people  who  do  not  use  benzodiazepines,  elderly
people who start benzodiazepine therapy have a 29% increased
risk for hypertension, a 45% increased risk for pain-related joint
complaints (an obvious predictor of hip fractures that is rarely
measured in research data), a 50% increased risk for self-report-
ing health as worse than that of peers, and a 36% increased risk for
being a current smoker (Figure 9) (35). Moreover, elderly people
prescribed benzodiazepines are more likely to have dementia, a
powerful  cause of  falls  and fractures  (36).  So benzodiazepine
users are more likely to fracture their hip even without taking any
medication.
Figure 9. Elderly people who begin benzodiazepine therapy (recipients) are
already sicker and more prone to fractures than nonrecipients. Figure is based
on data extracted from Luijendijk et al (35).
 
Weak research designs that do not control for
confounding by indication
Almost 30 years ago, a landmark study used Medicaid insurance
claims data to show a relationship between benzodiazepine use
and hip fractures in the elderly (32). The study has had a world-
wide influence on medical practice and helped usher in the mod-
ern field of drug safety research. Judging from news media re-
ports and the impact on policy, many people continue to assume
that benzodiazepines are a major cause of hip fractures.
One of  several  results  of  this  weak post-only epidemiological
study showed that current users of benzodiazepines were more
likely to fracture their hip than previous users (Figure 10). The au-
thors  stated that  this  comparison permitted them to determine
“possible changes in the risk of hip fracture after cessation of drug
use.” Unfortunately, they did not actually measure changes in frac-
ture risk after cessation. Instead, they compared people who had
already fractured their hip with people who had not (an epidemi-
ological case-control study). They found that hip fractures were
more likely to occur among sicker, longer-term recipients of ben-
zodiazepines than among healthier people who took a few pills
and stopped. Again, the results seem to have less to do with the
drug in  question than with the types of  people  who were pre-
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scribed the drug; the poorer health of current users (eg, having
senile dementia) may have been the reason for both the treatment
and the hip fracture.
Figure 10. Weak post-only epidemiological study suggesting that current users
of benzodiazepines are more likely than previous users to have hip fractures.
Figure is based on data extracted from Ray et al (32).
 
The researchers were able to gather little or no data on the sicker,
long-term benzodiazepine users from their insurance claims and so
could not accurately compare the 2 groups. If they had been able
to collect such information, their conclusions may have been dif-
ferent. In short, the researchers could not determine what would
have  happened if  these  sicker  patients  did  not  receive  benzo-
diazepines.
More than 2 dozen epidemiological studies of hip fractures and
benzodiazepines have been published since the original report in
1987 (37). Similar to the flip-flopping results of studies of the
risks and benefits of HRT (3), results of these later studies conflic-
ted with each other and with the early reports.
The estimated risks of a fracture shrank over time as investigators
did a better job of adjusting for the sicker patients who used ben-
zodiazepines. By the time a more rigorous epidemiological study
was conducted that controlled more completely for confounding
by indication, the proverbial horse was out of the barn; these in-
vestigators demonstrated that the excess risk of benzodiazepines
and hip fractures was so small that many considered the risk to be
negligible or nonexistent (37).
Strong research designs that do control for
confounding by indication
Case-control studies or “look-back” studies are weak designs for
evaluating medical treatments or other interventions because re-
searchers try to draw conclusions when comparing patients whose
differences, not treatment, may account for an effect. A stronger
research method is the longitudinal natural experiment, in which
researchers  follow a  group  over  time  as  their  medications  or
policies that affect them change.
Such  natural  experiments  allow  researchers  to  view  multiple
points before and after an intervention — to observe a pre-policy
trend and a post-policy trend. Rather than comparing different
groups of patients at a single point in time, researchers follow pa-
tient groups over time, to see if a change in medication is accom-
panied by a change in health. This quasi-experimental research
design is called an interrupted time-series design. The experiment
can be strengthened by following another group of patients who
have not experienced the change, a comparison series.
Figure 11 illustrates some of the effects that longitudinal interrup-
ted time-series designs can demonstrate. In Figure 11a, the inter-
vention had no effect on the pre-existing downward trend. If an in-
vestigator had simply looked at single data points before and after
the intervention (a pre–post design), he or she would mistakenly
conclude that the intervention had a large downward effect. But
accounting for the baseline trend shows that the intervention prob-
ably had no effect.
Figure 11. Several examples of effects that can be detected in interrupted
time-series studies. The blue bar represents an intervention.
 
Figure 11b illustrates a clear downward change from a pre-exist-
ing upward trend. A researcher looking at single before-and-after
data points would have falsely labeled that intervention a failure
(or  a  success,  depending  on  what  was  measured)  because  the
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downward trend after  the program equals  the upward trend at
baseline. Figure 11c shows a sudden change in level (2 flat lines
with a drop caused by an intervention), and Figure 11d shows a
pre-intervention downward trend followed by a reduced level and
sharper downward trend after the intervention.
These examples illustrate the advantages of graphical data, which
can show the true nature of trends. That is not to say that time-
series studies never lead to erroneous conclusions. They are just
less likely to do so than other designs.
In 1989 New York State began to require every prescription of
benzodiazepine to be accompanied by a triplicate prescription
form, a copy of which went to the New York State Department of
Health.  State  policy  makers  thought  this  would  limit  benzo-
diazepine use, thereby reducing costs, the prevalence of benzo-
diazepine abuse, and the risk of hip fracture. (In formulating the
policy, policy makers referred to the 1987 landmark study on ben-
zodiazepines  and  hip  fractures  [32].)  In  2007  researchers  ex-
amined the effects of the policy with a longitudinal study. The in-
vestigators examined health data for tens of thousands of elderly
women in New York State, before, during, and after the policy
limiting benzodiazepine use had been put into effect. The policy
had its intended effect: benzodiazepine use dropped by 60% (Fig-
ure 12). The researchers also collected similar data for a control
group of elderly women in New Jersey, where no such policy had
been put in place, and medication use did not change.
Figure 12. Benzodiazepine (BZ) use and risk of hip fracture among women
with Medicaid before and after regulatory surveillance restricting BZ use in
New York State. A BZ user was defined as a person who had received at least
1  dispensed  BZ  in  the  year  before  the  policy.  From  Annals  of  Internal
Medicine, Wagner AK, Ross-Degnan D, Gurwitz JH, Zhang F, Gilden DB, Cosler
L,  et  al.  Effect  of  New  York  State  regulatory  action  on  benzodiazepine
prescribing and hip fracture rates. 2007;146(2):96–103 (33). Reprinted with
the permission of American College of Physicians, Inc.
 
The researchers found that rather than a decrease in the incidence
of hip fractures, the incidence continued to rise among New York
women throughout the post-policy period; in fact, the incidence
was slightly higher in New York than in New Jersey, where ben-
zodiazepine use was constant (Figure 12). Contrary to decades of
previous studies, the editors of this study concluded that “[c]on-
trolling benzodiazepine prescribing may not reduce hip fractures,
possibly because the 2 are not causally related” (33).
Even today, many policies to control benzodiazepine use are based
on the early dramatic findings and decades of research that did not
control for confounding by indication. Like every other drug or
device, benzodiazepines have both benefits and risks, but they
probably have no effect on the risk of hip fracture.
The findings of these early and widely cited studies were magni-
fied by the news media, which had a resounding impact on the
public, clinicians, and policy makers. Rather than challenging the
studies, many reporters simply accepted their conclusions. For ex-
ample, on the day the 1987 study was published (32), The New
York Times stated that elderly people who use benzodiazepines
were “70% more likely to fall and fracture their hips than those
who take no such drugs” and that  “thousands of  hip  fractures
could be prevented each year” if use of the long-acting drugs were
discontinued. Box 4 shows how The Washington Post covered the
debunking of the early research, 2 decades later.
Box 4. The Washington Post, January 15, 2007
Study Debunks Sedative’s Link to Hip Fractures in Elderly
Sedative drugs called benzodiazepines (such as Valium) don’t
increase the risk of hip fractures in the elderly, a Harvard Medical
School study says. The finding suggests that US federal and state
policies that restrict access to these drugs among the elderly need
to be re-examined, the study authors added. . . . The policy
drastically decreased use of benzodiazepines in New York, and we




PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE VOLUME 12, E101
PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY           JUNE 2015
The opinions expressed by authors contributing to this journal do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
the Public Health Service, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, or the authors’ affiliated institutions.
10       Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  •  www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2015/15_0187.htm
We have cited several examples of contradictory findings on the
association between benzodiazepines and hip fractures among the
elderly published several years after misleading observational re-
search was first reported. As it did with the studies on the risks
and benefits of HRT, it  took many years to debunk the earlier
studies that were flawed to begin with and given credence by the
news media.
Case 4: Social Desirability Bias in
Studies of Programs to Reduce
Childhood Weight
This case example describes bias caused by self-reports of so-
cially desirable behavior (mothers reporting that their children
watch less television than they actually watch) that became exag-
gerated after  a  controlled trial  of  a  1-year  program to educate
mothers to reduce such sedentary activity. Comparing the reports
of these mothers with the reports of a control group (not participat-
ing in the program) further biased the widely reported findings.
The use of unobtrusive computer observations instead of self-re-
ports was a more valid approach.
Background
There is a widespread bias in health research studies that leads to
exaggerated conclusions and could be curtailed through the applic-
ation  of  common sense.  Researchers  often  use  self-reports  of
health behaviors by study participants. But if the participants in
such a study believe that one outcome is more socially desirable
then another (such as avoiding fatty foods or exercising regularly),
they will be more likely to state the socially desirable response —
basically telling researchers what they want to hear.
Some of the more interesting examples of this bias involve studies
of obesity and nutrition. A 1995 study showed that both men and
women tended to understate their true calorie and fat consumption
by as much as 68% in comparison to more objective methods (Fig-
ure 13). Women were 2 to 3 times more likely to underreport fat
and calorie intake then men (38).
Figure  13.  Underreporting  of  calories  and fat  consumption due to  social
desirability among women and men. Figure is based on data extracted from
Hebert  et  al  (38).  Fat  intake  was  measured  as  the  absolute  percentage
change for every 1% change in social desirability bias. The zero-line indicates
no underreporting.
 
These women were not lying. They were unconsciously seeing
their behavior as conforming to positive societal norms. The prin-
ciple applies to physicians as well. For example, when asked about
their compliance with national quality of care guidelines, physi-
cians overstated how well they did by about 30% in comparison to
more objective auditing of their clinical practices. Just like those
men and women self-reporting calorie and fat intake, these physi-
cians were not lying or deliberately misleading — they knew what
they should be doing and were pretty sure that they were doing it
almost all the time (39).
Weak research designs that do not control for social
desirability bias
Even very strong research designs like RCTs can be compromised
if the investigators unwittingly tip off the study group to the de-
sired outcomes.
The following example is one of many published studies that cre-
ated selection bias due to social desirability. The study was an
RCT of a 1-year primary care education program, High Five for
Kids, which attempted to motivate mothers to influence their chil-
dren to watch less television and follow more healthful diets to
lose weight (40). After receiving extensive, repetitive training in
various ways to reduce television time, mothers in the interven-
tion group were asked to estimate how much less television their
children were watching each day. The control group consisted of
mothers who did not receive training. Not surprisingly, after the
intervention the mothers trained to reduce their children’s televi-
sion watching reported significantly fewer hours  of  television
watching than mothers in the control group (Figure 14).
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Figure 14. Study that contaminated intervention group by unwittingly tipping
parents off to the socially desired outcome: fewer hours of television time per
day for children. Figure is based on data extracted from Taveras et al (40).
 
Studies with important limitations in design nevertheless can have
significant policy implications. On the basis of this study, the High
Five for Kids program was declared a success and was a model for
an obesity prevention research program in Mexico.
Strong research designs that do control for social
desirability bias
In childhood obesity research, it is difficult to design studies that
eliminate social desirability bias. In a comprehensive review of
measures of television watching, most studies used self-report
(41). But it is possible to use better study designs.
In 2008, researchers published a randomized controlled study of
an intervention to reduce childhood television and computer use to
decrease weight (42). Recognizing biases caused by self-reports
and social desirability bias, the investigators installed an electron-
ic device that was used to block about half the household televi-
sion and computer time of one group of families (the intervention
group). The investigators electronically measured the screen time
of those families for 15 months and compared it with the screen
time of families in a group whose screens were not blocked (con-
trol group) during that time. The participants did not know, and
were not asked, how much television they were watching, and the
researchers did not know which participants belonged to which
group. These measures avoided socially desirable self-reporting,
making the study results more valid than those in the previous ex-
ample. The device reduced the amount of time spent watching
television and videos by almost 18 hours per week in the interven-
tion group, about 5 times more than the reduction found in the
control group (Figure 15). Children in the intervention group also
lost more weight than children in the control group.
Figure  15.  Strong randomized controlled  trial  design using  an electronic
device that caused an involuntary reduction in television and computer use.
The difference in  decline  in  viewing between the intervention group and
control group was significant. Figure is based on data extracted from Epstein
et al (42).
 
Case 5: History Bias in Studies of
Hospital Patient Safety Initiatives
This case example describes history bias: uncontrolled pre-exist-
ing or co-occurring downward trends in mortality that investigat-
ors mistakenly attributed to their national patient safety initiatives.
Flawed results from their experiments led to worldwide move-
ments to adopt and entrench ineffective initiatives. In studies of
health care and policies, it is essential to graph and display time
trends before and after the intervention — a fundamental element
of time-series studies.  Stronger designs using baseline secular
trends debunked the early,  exaggerated studies,  but  only after
worldwide adoption of the weak initiatives.
Background
A common threat to the credibility of health research is history bi-
as. History bias can occur when events that take place before or
during the intervention may have a greater effect than the interven-
tion itself. An example of this kind of bias took place in a study of
an intervention using medical opinion leaders to recommend ap-
propriate drugs to their colleagues for patients with acute myocar-
dial infarction (43).
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Control hospitals (ie, those that did not receive the intervention)
still had the desirable changes (Figure 16). These changes were 1)
the increased use of 2 medications, β blockers and thrombolytic
agents, both of which reduce mortality and 2) a decreased use of
lidocaine, the routine use of which is associated with increased
mortality  (43).  The  figure  illustrates  that  care  improved even
without the intervention. In other words, other historical forces
were leading to the increased use of effective treatments and the
decreased use of harmful drugs.
Figure 16. Percentage of acute myocardial infarction patients who received
essential life-saving drugs (β blockers and thrombolytics) and a drug linked
with increased mortality (lidocaine) in control hospitals before and after an
intervention. Figure is based on data extracted from Soumerai et al (43).
 
What could cause such historical biases? This intervention took
place during an explosion of research and news media reporting
on treatments for acute myocardial infarction that could have in-
fluenced the prescribing behavior of physicians. At the same time,
the US Department of Health and Human Services launched a na-
tional program targeting the drugs in the study, and the American
College of Cardiology and the American Hospital  Association
jointly released new guidelines for the early management of pa-
tients with acute myocardial infarction. In the complex environ-
ment of health care, policies, and behavior, hundreds of historical
events, if not controlled for, could easily account for the “effects”
of policies and interventions. Fortunately, the use of a randomized
control group in this example accounted for changes that had noth-
ing to do with the study intervention.
Weak research designs that do not control for
history bias
In 1999, the Institute of Medicine issued a landmark report on how
the misuse of technologies and drugs may be causing illnesses and
deaths in hospitals  throughout  the nation (44).  Since then,  re-
searchers and policy makers have been trying to find ways to im-
prove patient safety. However, the research designed to advance
this agenda is often too weak to measure the effects on safety. For
example, a recent study was designed to measure the impact of a
large patient safety program on death rates in one hospital net-
work (45). The program focused on 6 laudable goals, including re-
ducing the number of adverse drug events, birth traumas, fall in-
juries, hospital-acquired infections, surgical complications, and
pressure ulcers. Unfortunately, the investigators measured mortal-
ity rates only after planning and initiating the program (Figure 17),
so it is impossible to know whether the reduction in mortality rates
resulted from the quality improvement program or from the con-
tinuation of pre-existing trends (history bias).
Figure 17. Example of a weak post-only study of a hospital safety program and
mortality that did not control for history. Narrow bar shows start of quality of
care program. There is  no evidence that  data are available for  the years
leading up to the program. The study did not define the intervention period
other than to state that planning occurred in 2003. Figure is based on data
extracted from Pryor et al (45). Abbreviation: FY, fiscal year.
 
No data are available for the years before the hospitals put their
program in  place.  Without  that  baseline  data,  such  post-only
designs cannot provide any realistic assessment of a program’s
success (Box 5).
Box 5. Health Affairs, April 2011
“The Quality ‘Journey’ At Ascension Health: How We’ve Prevented
At Least 1,500 Avoidable Deaths A Year — And Aim To Do Even
Better” (45).
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Equally common, many pre–post studies have only one measure-
ment  before  the  intervention and one measurement  afterward.
Such a design is not much different than the weak design of the
study  illustrated  in  Figure  17,  because  we  have  no  idea  what
would have happened anyway on the basis of the missing pre-ex-
isting trend in mortality.
Another example of weak design is a study (46,47) of the Institute
for Healthcare Improvement’s (IHI’s) program, the 100,000 Lives
Campaign, to prevent hospital deaths in the United States. The
campaign consisted of interventions such as deploying rapid re-
sponse teams to help patients with acute decompensations in the
hospital and strategies for preventing life-threatening hospital-ac-
quired infections. As in the study on the patient safety program
and hospital death rates (45), the researchers in the study on the
IHI campaign measured the trends in death rates only one year be-
fore and several years during the study period. They created, in es-
sence, a weak pre–post study design with no control group to ac-
count for previously occurring changes in deaths that may have
had nothing to do with the program (46,47). The IHI issued a press
release claiming the program saved 122,300 lives in an 18-month
period, which a credulous media repeated (Box 6). But without
data on pre-existing trends,  IHI’s conclusion that  the program
saved lives is not tenable.
Box 6. The Associated Press, June 14, 2006
Campaign against hospital mistakes says 122,000 lives
saved
A campaign to reduce lethal errors and unnecessary deaths in
U.S. hospitals has saved an estimated 122,300 lives in the last
18 months, the campaign’s leader said Wednesday. . . . “We in
health care have never seen or experienced anything like this,”
said Dr. Dennis O’Leary, president of the Joint Commission on




Strong research designs that do control for history
bias
Does more rigorous evidence support the notion that the 100,000
Lives Campaign actually reduced mortality rates? To investigate
that question, we obtained 12 years of national statistics on hospit-
al mortality, longitudinal data from before the program went into
effect (48). We found that mortality was already declining long
before the program began (Figure 18) and that during the program
the decline continued at roughly the same rate. These data demon-
strate that inpatient mortality in the United States was declining
before, during, and after the 100,000 Lives Campaign. The pro-
gram itself  probably had no effect  on the trend,  yet  the wide-
spread policy and media reports led to several European countries
adopting this “successful” model of patient safety at considerable
costs.
Figure 18. Example of a strong time-series design that controlled for history
bias in the Institute for Healthcare Improvement’s 100,000 Lives Campaign.
Figure is based on data from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(48).
 
Subsequently, several large RCTs demonstrated that many com-
ponents of the 100,000 Lives Campaign were not particularly ef-
fective (49), especially when compared with the benefits reported
in the IHI’s press releases.
Conclusion
Scientists, journalists, policy makers, and members of the public
often do not realize the extent to which bias affects the trustwor-
thiness of research. We hope this article helps to elucidate the
most common designs that either fall prey to biases or fail to con-
trol for their effects. Because much of this evidence is easily dis-
played and interpreted, we encourage the use of visual data sets in
presenting health-related information. To further clarify our mes-
sage, here (Box 7) is a simple ranking of the ability of most re-
search designs to control for common biases to help readers de-
termine which studies are trustworthy.
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Box 7. Hierarchy of Strong Designs and Weak Designs,
Based on Design’s Capacity to Control for Most Biases
Hierarchy of Design
Strong designs: often trustworthy effects
Multiple randomized
controlled trials
The “gold standard” of evidence
Randomized controlled trials A strong design, but sometimes
not feasible
Interrupted time series with a
control series
Baseline trends often allow visible
effects and controls for biases
Intermediate designs: Sometimes trustworthy effects
Single interrupted time series Controls for trends, but has no
comparison group





Comparability of baseline trend
often unknown
Weak designs: rarely trustworthy effects (no controls for common
biases, excluded from literature syntheses)
Uncontrolled before and after
(pre–post)
Simple observations before and
after, no baseline trends
Cross-sectional designs Simple correlation, no baseline, no
measure of change
Further guidance on research design hierarchy is available (50).
These design principles have implications for the tens of billions
of dollars spent on medical research in the United States each year.
Systematic reviews of health care intervention studies show that
half or more of published studies use weak designs and are un-
trustworthy. The results of weak study design are flawed science,
misconstrued  policies,  and  potentially  billions  or  trillions  of
wasted dollars.
This article and these case reports barely break the surface of what
can go wrong in studies of health care. If we do not learn and ap-
ply the basics of research design, scientists will continue to gener-
ate flip-flopping studies that emphasize drama over reality, and
policy makers, journalists, and the public will continue to be per-
plexed. Adherence to the principles outlined in this article will
help users of research discriminate between biased findings and
credible findings of health care studies.
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